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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920830-CA 
v. : 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka : 
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS 
GREGORY MATISON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the officer have a reasonable suspicion of 
other criminal activity to support the investigative detention of 
defendant beyond the scope of detention permitted for a traffic 
stop? 
This issue is one of fact under which the trial court's 
findings will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). Factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or the appellate court reaches a 
"definite and firm conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990), 
2. Was defendant's consent to search the car he was 
driving given voluntarily? 
The question of whether or not a consent to search is 
voluntary is a mixed question of fact and law; this Court may 
reverse the trial court's factual findings only if they are 
clearly erroneous, however this Court reviews the ultimate 
conclusion of voluntariness for correctness. State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-60 (1973)). 
3. Did the trial court correctly find that defendant 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched 
luggage when defendant presented conflicting evidence to support 
his assertion of a claim in that luggage? 
The trial court's determination of whether or not 
defendant demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search is one of fact, that is reviewed 
for clear error. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 
1991). 
4. Has defendant demonstrated that this Court should 
depart from the well established federal standard for determining 
voluntariness of consent to search by requiring officers to 
inform suspects that under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution they may refuse consent? 
2 
The interpretation of a constitutional provision 
presents a question of law that this Court reviews for 
correctness. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 
1991). 
5. If this Court formulates a new requirement for law 
enforcement should that rule only be applied prospectively? 
This issue is governed by the same standard of review 
as issue 5. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1990) (R. 1). 
Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana seized from 
luggage in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving at the time of 
the traffic stop (R. 22-23, 50-80). Following an evidentiary 
hearing (R. 120-62), the trial court denied defendant's motion 
(R. 34-37) (a complete copy of the court's findings is contained 
in Addendum A). 
The court tried the case based on the transcript of the 
suppression hearing and a video of the investigatory stop (R. 
3 
167-71)-1 The court found defendant guilty based on the 
stipulated evidence (R. 174). However, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1992), the trial court reduced defendant's 
conviction one degree and sentenced defendant to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed a $5,000 fine (Tr. 
Jan. 19, 1993 at 11). The court suspended the sentence and fine 
on condition that defendant serve one year in the Sevier County 
Jail subject to review after 90 days with a reduction of the fine 
to $1,250 and the statutory surcharge (Tr. Jan. 19, 1993 at 12). 
The trial court stayed defendant's sentence during the pendency 
of this appeal (Tr. Jan. 19, 1993 at 14). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law accurately recite the facts pertinent to this appeal (R. 34-
38) (Addendum A). The court's findings are therefore reproduced 
here, adding citations to the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing,2 transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress 
and to a video tape of the stop (Exhibit 1): 
1. On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney 
was traveling to the Salina interchange of I-
70 when he observed a vehicle which had just 
come off the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such 
exit (R. 100, 126). 
2The parties stipulated that the material seized was marijuana 
and that there were 138,25 pounds of it (R. 167-69). 
2The transcripts of the preliminary hearing and arraignment 
were not part of the stipulated evidence heard at trial. 
However, Judge Don V. Tibbs presided at all hearings involving 
the defendant. Defendant relies on these transcripts in his 
brief (Br. App. at 5) and the State will as well. 
4 
2. Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish 
tail" (R. 100, 101, 127) as it came onto the 
access road from the freeway and then the 
vehicle stopped at a gas station/convenience 
store (R. 100, 101, 128). 
3. Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway 
underpass where the vehicle had been out of 
control to determine whether the action was 
the result of icy conditions and observed 
that the road was dry (R. 100, 101, 102, 
127) . 
4. The officer observed that the driver of 
the vehicle was still stopped at the business 
establishment and commenced traffic 
enforcement activities on 1-70 east of Salina 
(R. 102, 128). 
5. Upon subsequently observing the vehicle 
traveling eastbound out of Salina and knowing 
that there are no services for 110 miles in 
such direction (R. 129), Deputy Barney 
decided to stop the vehicle to determine 
whether the driver was impaired or why the 
driver was unable to control the vehicle at 
the Salina interchange (R. 102, 129). 
6. The officer stopped the vehicle at 1:33 
p.m. as shown on the video tape recording of 
the scene of the stop (Exhibit 1). 
7. When the officer approached the 
Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant asked, 
"What am I being stopped for? Am I 
speeding?" (Exhibit 1, R. 131). 
8. Deputy Barney responded by indicating 
that he would explain in a moment and asked 
for the license and registration to the 
vehicle (Exhibit 1, R. 102, 131). 
9. At 1:34:14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained 
the reason for the stop and the Defendant 
stated that he had been having trouble with 
his cruise control and that was why he was 
unable to control the vehicle (Exhibit 1, R. 
133) . 
10. Deputy Barney had at this point smelled 
the odor of fresh ground coffee, an 
ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of 
5 
raw marijuana (R. 106, 132), and noted the 
extreme nervousness3 of the Defendant who 
had offered an unreasonable explanation of 
his traveling in a vehicle for which he was 
not the owner (Exhibit 1, R. 103, 104). 
11. Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle 
contained firearms or drugs (Exhibit 1, R. 
132, 133-34) and after receiving a negative 
response (Exhibit 1) asked, "May I look in 
the vehicle?" (Exhibit 1, R. 105, 134). 
12. The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m. 
(Exhibit 1).4 
13. At 1:35:50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the 
Defendant, "Would you pop the trunk," 
(Exhibit 1, R. 106-07, 134) and the Defendant 
opened the trunk (Exhibit 1, R. 134). 
14. Upon observing the suitcases in the 
trunk (Exhibit 1, R. 108-09) and smelling the 
suitcase (R. 109, 134), Deputy Barney 
handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at 
1:36:38 p.m. (Exhibit 1, R. 109, 134). 
15. At 1:38:02, Deputy Barney opened one of 
the cases sufficiently to observe marijuana 
(Exhibit 1, R. 108-09, 134). 
16. The vehicle was found to contain 138.25 
pounds of marijuana (R. 106, 168). 
3The trial court's reliance on nervousness is misplaced. 
Although it may be probative in some circumstances, in this case 
there was neither testimony about the degree of defendant's 
nervousness as compared to typical cases, nor testimony about the 
manifestations of nervousness. Accordingly, that fact does not 
contribute to a reasonable suspicion in this case. 
40fficer Barney asked about the contents of defendant's 
pants pockets when he observed a bulge in defendant's pocket. 
Apparently he was concerned that defendant might be carrying a 
weapon (Exhibit 1). See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J. concurring) (police officer was 
justified in frisking an individual suspected of transporting 
narcotics because such individuals "might be armed to protect 
themselves"). 
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Based on the above findings of fact, th^ court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. The court further determined: 
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or 
testimony regarding his claim of interest in 
the substance seized or the contents of the 
vehicle and he lacks standing to challenge 
the search. 
2. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle 
was pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement 
function. 
3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the 
presence of firearms or drugs, voluntarily 
consented to open the vehicle for inspection. 
4. The officer used no threats or coercion 
and the Defendant's actions were voluntary. 
(R. 34-38) (Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's implicit finding that Deputy Barney's 
continued investigative detention of defendant beyond the scope 
of a traffic stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity is amply supported by the record. The trial 
court correctly found that defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search of the vehicle and trunk based on the fact that there was 
no coercion or threats made by Deputy Barney. After defendant 
opened the trunk for Deputy Barney, the odor of marijuana and 
known masking agents established probable cause for a warrantless 
search of the luggage in the trunk. Moreover, even if this Court 
determines that the consent is somehow tainted, the trial court 
correctly concluded that defendant failed to meet his burden of 
showing an expectation of privacy in the luggage. Accordingly, 
defendant may not challenge the legality of the search. 
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This Court should not depart from the well established 
federal standard for determining voluntariness of consent. 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the Utah Constitution 
requires the State to show that voluntary consent can only be 
given with knowledge of the right to refuse consent. 
Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's expansive 
interpretation of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
If this Court creates such a rule, that rule should apply 
prospectively and have no retroactive affect. 
ARGUMENT5 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS TRANSPORTING NARCOTICS WHEN HE 
ASKED ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP. 
The trial court's determination that the stop and 
detention of defendant were supported by reasonable suspicion is 
not clearly erroneous (R. 35). Indeed, defendant does not 
challenge the propriety of the initial stop. Br. of App. at 
13.6 In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that he "was 
5Defendant labels his issues as focusing on article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Br. of App. at 2. However, 
with the exception of his argument in Point IV, he relies on 
analysis of the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution as interpreted by Utah and federal courts. 
Consequently, with the exception of that issue, the State will 
not analyze the issues under the Utah Constitution, but will, 
like defendant, engage in fourth amendment analysis. State v. 
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). 
6This position is proper in light of the undisputed facts. 
Deputy Barney testified that he stopped defendant because he saw 
the vehicle "fish tail as it entered US-50" (R. 127). Defendant 
admitted to "fishtailing" on the videotape of the stop (Exhibit 
8 
detained without an articulable or reasonable suspicion that he 
was involved in criminal activity [following the stop]." Br. of 
App. at 18. Defendant's analysis ignores critical trial court 
findings and analysis. 
An investigative detention of a vehicle "'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.'" State v. Higgins, 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)), 
cert, granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah May 18, 1993); State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). See State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1990) ("[a]n officer conducting a routine 
traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation;" 
however, unless there is reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity beyond the traffic violation, the detention must end). 
Based on this Court's caselaw, Deputy Barney's 
questions about narcotics and firearms went beyond the scope of 
the initial traffic stop. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 
(Utah App. 1990); State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 
1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, defendant's detention beyond this initial purpose was 
justified by a reasonable suspicion of additional wrongdoing. 
See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (an 
1). Deputy Barney testified that he was concerned that defendant 
might be impaired or that there might be a safety problem since 
defendant was driving in a direction where there were no services 
for 100 miles (Exhibit 1, R. 129). 
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officer may detain an individual beyond initial purpose of stop, 
"only if, during the course of the traffic stop, the officer 
discovers acts which give him or her reasonable suspicion of 
other more serious criminal activity"). 
This Court has recognized that "the odor of marijuana 
xhas a distinct smell' and can alone 'satisfy the probable cause 
requirement to search[.]'" State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297 
300 (10th Cir. 1991)). See also State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 
972-73 (Utah App. 1992) (same). Specifically, Deputy Barney 
smelled the "very heavy" odor of coffee grounds when he first 
approached defendant's window (R. 132).7 The trial court found 
that coffee grounds are commonly used to mask the odor of illegal 
drugs (R. 36). This finding is amply supported by decisions from 
other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 
F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[ijnside the trunk the agent 
found several bags of coffee . . . . The agent knew that coffee 
was sometimes used to mask the odor of narcotics"); United States 
7As this Court stated in State v. Menke: 
The trained law enforcement officer is in a 
different position than the average citizen 
in that he or she "may be able to perceive 
and articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained 
observer. . . . The officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience." 
787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting State v. Truiillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88-89 (Utah App. 1987)). Officer Barney's 
undisputed experience and the articulated facts rendered the 
additional questioning of defendant permissible. 
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v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[defendants] flew 
from New York to Peoria with a plastic bag containing six ounces 
of cocaine sealed within a second plastic bag containing coffee 
grounds, in an attempt to conceal the cocaine odor"); United 
States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765, 767 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) ("coffee 
grounds are used by narcotics traffickers to disguise the odor of 
drugs"); United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 
1990) ("[officer] knew [coffee grounds, air freshener, and 
ammonia] are commonly used to disguise the odor of narcotics from 
humans and dogs"); United States v. Padron, 657 F.Supp. 840, 848-
49 (D.Del. 1987) ("[d]efendants argue that it was objectively 
impossible to smell the raw marijuana because it was enclosed in 
plastic ziplocked bags, surrounded by coffee grounds"); People v. 
Small, 252 Cal.Rptr. 41, 43 (Cal.App.3 Dist. 1988) 
([m]ethamphetamine found with "several damp coffee filters that 
contained a strong odor"); Kemp v. State, 411 S.E.2d 880, 881 
(Ga.App. 1991) ("[b]ecause the package emitted a strong odor of 
coffee, a substance drug dealers sometimes use to mask the odor 
of cocaine, the package was opened . . . and approximately 50 0 
grams of cocaine were discovered"). The smell of a distinctive 
masking agent, therefore, was sufficient under the less stringent 
reasonable suspicion standard, to support Deputy Barney's 
investigatory detention beyond the scope of a traffic stop. 
Dudley, 847 P.2d at 426 n.l. 
Defendant fails to acknowledge or challenge these 
critical facts and fails to recognize their significance in 
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establishing reasonable suspicion to justify Deputy Barney's 
decision to investigate the possibility of drug trafficking. See 
Br. of App. Point II. By ignoring the trial court's factual 
findings, and the evidence in support of those findings, 
defendant fails to demonstrate clear error in either the trial 
court's credibility determinations, or its implicit finding of 
reasonable suspicion for the continued detention beyond the 
purpose of the initial traffic stop. This Court should affirm 
the trial court's ruling. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO DEPUTY BARNEY'S 
REQUEST TO SEARCH THE CAR. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ULTIMATE CONCLUSION THAT THIS CONSENT WAS 
VOLUNTARY IS CORRECT. 
In Points III and IV of his brief, defendant asserts 
the trial court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to 
the search of the car or its contents. Br. of App. at 19-33. 
Alternatively, assuming his consent was voluntarily given, 
defendant complains that the trial court failed to determine 
whether his consent was sufficiently attenuated from the alleged 
illegal stop. Br. of App. 33-37. Defendant's contentions lack 
merit. 
A. Standard of Review for Voluntariness of Consent 
In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993), 
the supreme court resolved a split between panels of this Court 
as to the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's 
determination of the voluntariness of a consent to search. It 
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held that "the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent 
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness!;] 
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will 
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." 
846 P.2d at 1271 (citations omitted). 
B. Voluntariness Standard 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to voluntary 
consent is valid under the fourth amendment. State v. Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992). "*[W]hether the requisite 
voluntariness exists depends on the "totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details" of police conduct.'" Thurman, 846 P.2d 
at 1262-63 (quoting State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
1990), in turn quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226 (1973)). "[B]oth the 'characteristics of the accused' and 
the 'details of police conduct' must be considered in determining 
whether a defendant's consent was actually a product of his or 
her free will." Id. at 1263 (citations omitted). The burden of 
proving the voluntariness of consent falls on the prosecution. 
C. Voluntary Consent Finding is Correct 
Defendant misstates the record and fails to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings underlying its 
determination that the consent to search was voluntary. He 
therefore fails to demonstrate that the trial court's finding 
that he consented to the search is clearly erroneous (R. 36). He 
13 
likewise fails to demonstrate that the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that this consent was voluntary is incorrect (R. 37). 
The trial court specifically found: 
12. The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m. 
(Exhibit 1). 
3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the 
presence of firearms or drugs, voluntarily 
consented to open the vehicle for inspection. 
4. The officer used no threats or coercion 
and the Defendant's actions were voluntary. 
(R. 37) , (Exhibit 1), see Addendum A. Ignoring these findings of 
the trial court, Defendant alleges: 
The deputy then directed that the search be 
made of the trunk. When the Appellant 
hesitated, the deputy ordered him to open the 
trunk. He asked the Appellant what he had to 
hide. The Appellant was put in a position of 
either admitting there was contraband in the 
vehicle or stating that there was no good 
reason why the trooper could not look in the 
trunk. 
Br. of App. at 23. The record is devoid of any evidence that 
this description of the events is accurate. Rather, the record 
clearly shows that Deputy Barney asked defendant "Would you pop 
the trunk?" (Exhibit 1), (R. 106-07, 134). He never "ordered" 
defendant to open any part of the car. Likewise, Deputy Barney 
never asked defendant "what he had to hide." Br. App. at 23, 
(Exhibit 1). Defendant's misrepresentation of the facts in this 
case should lead this Court to disregard his claim of error.8 
8
"Referring to matters that are not part of the record in 
the trial court . . . [is] entirely inappropriate and irrelevant 
to this proceeding. We do not consider such material." State v. 
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The trial court made the following findings concerning 
the voluntariness of defendant's consent: Deputy Barney asked if 
he could "look in the vehicle," (R. 36) to which defendant 
responded, "Yes, sir", (Exhibit 1), (R. 36). After searching the 
interior, the deputy asked defendant, "would you pop the trunk?" 
(Exhibit 1). Defendant unhesitatingly opened the trunk, never 
attempted to limit the scope of the search and never complained 
about the scope of the search, (Exhibit 1). Based on these 
facts, the court properly concluded that "[d]efendant voluntarily 
consented to the search and there is no evidence of coercion" (R. 
37) . 
D. Attenuation Analysis Unnecessary 
Finally, this Court need not consider defendant's 
additional complaint that the trial court failed to determine 
whether his consent was attenuated from the alleged illegal stop 
under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Br. of App. at 
33-37, See also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (clarifying Arroyo). 
Defendant has not demonstrated that Deputy Barney's search 
request was preceded by any illegality; thus, there was no need 
for the trial court to engage in an attenuation analysis below. 
Accordingly, this Court need not engage in an attenuation 
analysis on appeal. See State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.l 
(Utah App. 1993) (attenuation analysis applies only if a prior 
Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); gge also State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (reviewing court will 
not rule on a question that depends upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record). 
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police illegality exists). If this Court determines that a prior 
illegality did occur, the proper remedy is to remand this case to 
the trial court in order for that court to engage in the 
attenuation analysis required by Thurman. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A SUBJECTIVE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE SEARCHED 
LUGGAGE. ACCORDINGLY, HE CANNOT CHALLENGE 
THE PROPRIETY OF THAT SEARCH. ALTERNATIVELY, 
THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM SINCE THE OFFICER HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH ONCE DEFENDANT 
OPENED THE TRUNK OF THE CAR. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Pound That Defendant 
Did Not Demonstrate a Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
in the Searched Luggage. 
The trial court, after reviewing the video tape, 
(Exhibit 1), the testimony of Deputy Barney, the arguments of 
counsel and detailed memoranda, concluded: 
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or 
testimony regarding his claim of interest in 
the substance seized or the contents of the 
vehicle and he lacks standing to challenge 
the search. 
(R. 37).9 Defendant fails to demonstrate clear error in this 
9The State recognizes that under this Court's holding in 
State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah App. 1992), that 
defendant's claim that a "friend" had loaned him the car (Exhibit 
1) may be sufficient to assert a subjective interest in the 
interior and trunk of the car. However, defendant's failure to 
demonstrate a subjective interest in the luggage where Deputy 
Barney discovered the marijuana is fatal to his claim. 
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finding.10 Therefore, he cannot complain about any alleged 
illegality. 
In order to challenge the legality of the search, 
defendant must demonstrate that the search violated his fourth 
amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 
430 (1978)); Marshall. 791 P.2d at 886. To meet this burden, 
defendant must show that he subjectively expected that the 
searched area was private to him and that this expectation was 
legitimate in the view of society. State v. Scott. No. 920601-
CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. October 8, 1993) (citing Katz v. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); Rakas. 439 U.S. 
at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 887 
(defendant's burden "to develop the relevant facts below"). 
After defendant opened the trunk, Deputy Barney, upon 
observing the luggage, asked "Whose is this?" Defendant replied 
"It's mine." Deputy Barney then asked "It's all yours?" 
Defendant replied "Yeah." Deputy Barney then questioned 
"Marijuana?" To this question defendant responded "No." 
10State v. Tavlor sets out a bifurcated standard of review 
for this issue. "The first step involves a determination of 
whether the individual has demonstrated 'a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the object of the challenged search.' We review 
the pertinent findings under a clearly erroneous standard." 818 
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). The ultimate 
conclusion of whether or not society would recognize that 
subjective expectation is then reviewed for correctness. Id. 
Accord United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (10th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Evster. 948 F.2d 1196, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1991). Therefore, when the individual fails to carry his 
burden under the first prong (as defendant failed to do here), 
there is no reason to reach the second prong. Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 150, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 (1978). 
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However, defendant, once handcuffed, responded to the question of 
"How much do you have in here?" by stating "I don't know what's 
in, I don't know." Again, when Deputy Barney asked, "Whose are 
these?" Defendant replied, "I don't know." Deputy Barney then 
stated "You don't know whose they are?" Defendant responded, "I 
don't know, well, those suitcases are Jerry's but some of the 
stuff was in the trunk of the car." (Exhibit 1). 
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant 
presented no other evidence to support his claim of a subjective 
interest in the luggage and marijuana in the trunk of the car. 
This Court in Scott recognized that where a defendant fails to 
demonstrate "an interest in the property seized, he has not 
demonstrated an expectation of privacy and thus has no standing 
to challenge the search." Scott, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added). 
As this Court stated in Marshall, 
[defendant] has the ultimate burden of proof 
to establish that his fourth amendment rights 
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that 
he had an expectation of privacy in the . . . 
articles seized. 
791 P.2d at 886. Here, the trial court found that defendant's 
ambiguous statements were insufficient to meet this burden of 
proof. This failure demonstrated defendant's lack of a 
subjective interest of privacy in the luggage where Deputy Barney 
found the marijuana. 
On appeal defendant reasserts his claim that he was a 
"bailee" of the luggage and therefore had a legitimate privacy 
interest the luggage. See Br. of App. 6-13 and (R. 51-56). 
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However, defendant never presented any evidence to support his 
claim that a bailment had been created between himself and 
someone else. He merely asserted in his supporting memorandum, 
and asserts again on appeal, that he was the bailee of the 
luggage. Br. of App. at 6-13 and (R. 51-56). 
This Court has recognized that: 
The factor determining whether the 
transaction is a bailment is whether the 
bailor surrenders possession and control over 
the property to the owner of the premises 
where the property is placed. 
McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant failed to show the existence of any "bailor" in this 
case.11 
As this Court stated in Scott. 
Since the defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, he has no standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the 
search. Therefore, the trial court properly 
denied his motion to suppress the discovered 
evidence. 
Scott, slip op. at 5-6. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the 
trial court incorrectly concluded that he had no standing to 
challenge the search of the luggage. This Court should affirm 
that conclusion. 
^Defendant cites to United States v. Benitez-Arrecruin, 973 
F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that possession of 
luggage as a bailee is sufficient to find an expectation of 
privacy. However, defendant ignores that the Tenth Circuit held 
that "[a] proponent of a motion to suppress who relies upon the 
lawful possession factor bears the burden of presenting at least 
some evidence that his or her possession was lawful." Id. at 
828. Defendant failed to present any evidence that he lawfully 
possessed the luggage. 
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B. This Court May Affirm the Trial Court's Denial of 
the Motion to Suppress on the Alternative Ground that 
Deputy Barney had Probable Cause to Search the Luggage 
Once Defendant Opened the Trunk. 
Even if this Court concludes that defendant established 
an expectation of privacy in the searched luggage, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress 
on the alternative ground that the search of the luggage was 
reasonable based on probable cause. State v. Potter, No. 920579, 
slip op. at 3-4 (Utah App. September 8, 1993) ("we may affirm on 
any proper ground"). Once Deputy Barney smelled marijuana along 
with known masking agents, he had probable cause to search the 
source of those odors. The smell of marijuana alone created 
probable cause allowing a warrantless search of the luggage in 
the trunk. 
Deputy Barney testified that after defendant opened the 
trunk, "There was a heavy smell again of, aside of coffee 
grounds, lying--oh, the sight of coffee grounds, lying all across 
the trunk, also a smell of--later identified as fabric softener, 
these type sheets that are put in a dryer. And I could also 
smell marijuana." (R. 134). This Court has recognized that "the 
odor of marijuana xhas a distinct smell' and can alone "satisfy 
the probable cause requirement to search[.]/lf State v. Dudley, 
847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v. 
Morin, 949 F.2d 297 300 (10th Cir. 1991)). See also State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 
Moreover, the odors of known masking agents provided further 
indication of illegal activity. As this Court stated in State v. 
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Bartlev, "[i]t is well-established that probable cause for arrest 
may arise from an officer's sense of smell." 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 
(Utah App. 1989) . See footnote 6, supra. See also United States 
v. Medina, 543 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The officer had 
probable cause to search the car after appellant ran the 
checkpoint, after his car interior smelled of air freshener, and 
after he denied having a key to the trunk."); United States v. 
Reyna, 546 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable cause to search 
was established . . . by the discernible odor of air-freshener in 
the car, the nervousness of the passenger, and the unbelievable 
story told by the driver about the missing trunk key."); United 
States v. Koeniq, 856 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Cocaine is 
ofttimes packed in laundry products to mask its smell. . . . 
wrapped in fabric softener sheets, he found two transparent 
plastic bags containing white powder"); United States v. Rich, 
992 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The suitcase contained 
marijuana packed in fabric softener tissues"); State v. Johnson, 
516 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1987) ("The trooper 
explained that fabric softener was often used to conceal the odor 
of marijuana"); State v. Rosboroucrh, 615 P.2d 84, 85 (Ha. 1980) 
("The chemical odor emanated from two plastic air fresheners, an 
apparent attempt to disguise the scent of marijuana"); State v. 
Thompson. 543 So.2d 1077, 1079 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1989) ("five years 
of experience in traffic stops and drug arrests had taught him 
that these aromas [fabric softener or air freshener] were 
sometimes used in an attempt to mask the odor of marijuana"); 
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State v. Cabanas, 594 So.2d 404, 406 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991) ("a 
heavy odor of fabric softener is sometimes used to mask illegal 
drugs in order to thwart detection by drug detector dogs"); State 
v. Garza, 853 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo.App.S.D. 1993) ("the air 
fresheners were there to disguise the odor of marijuana"); 
Murillo v. State, 850 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th 
Dist.] 1993) ("[Officer] opened the bag and noticed a strong odor 
of fabric softener which he had learned from past investigations 
is used to cover up the smell of narcotics"); State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986) (factors suggesting defendant was a 
drug courier included fact that car contained "strong air 
fresheners"). 
Since Deputy Barney had probable cause to search at 
this time, the issue of whether defendant's consent to search 
included the luggage becomes moot. See Naisbitt. 827 P.2d at 
971-72. This Court can, therefore, affirm the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress based on this alternative 
ground. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ANY REASON 
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD DEPART FROM THE WELL 
ESTABLISHED FEDERAL STANDARD FOR DETERMINING 
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONSENT TO SEARCH BY 
REQUIRING OFFICERS TO INFORM SUSPECTS THAT 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION THEY MAY REFUSE 
CONSENT. 
The question of whether article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution requires that the State prove that a person was 
aware of his right to decline a request to search before a 
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consent to that search may be deemed valid was previously raised 
in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990). In Bobo, 
this Court refused to reach the issue because of inadequate 
briefing. Id. However, in a footnote, the Bobo court suggested 
a three part analysis to employ when advancing novel state 
constitutional arguments: 1) Counsel should offer analysis of the 
unique context in which Utah's constitution developed; 2) Counsel 
should demonstrate that state appellate courts regularly 
interpret even textually similar state constitutional provisions 
in a manner different from their federal counterparts; and 3) 
Citation should be made to authority from other states supporting 
the particular construction urged by counsel. Id. at 1272 n.5. 
An analysis of defendant's proposed construction of article I, 
section 14 demonstrates that there is no basis for departing from 
the federal standard for determining voluntariness of consent to 
a search. 
1. The Historical Context Surrounding the Adoption of 
Article I, Section 14 Weighs Against Departing from the 
Federal Standard for Determining Voluntariness of a 
Consent to Search. 
The first factor to consider in advancing a state 
constitutional argument is the historical context in which the 
particular provision under review was adopted. Defendant argues 
that because the early Mormon pioneers came to Utah to avoid 
religious and political persecution, and that because the 
practice of polygamy prompted the passage of federal criminal 
laws that resulted in the prosecution of Utah residents and the 
forfeiture of their property, "it is unquestionable that the Utah 
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State Constitution was intended to limit the power of the 
government to a greater extent than the same federal 
constitutional provisions." Br. of App. at 27. Because many 
framers of the Utah Constitution were polygamists whose homes had 
been searched by federal anti-polygamy agents, the argument goes, 
they must have contemplated broader state search and seizure 
protections than were provided under the federal constitution. 
While at first glance defendant's argument may have some appeal, 
closer scrutiny reveals that it is significantly flawed. 
If the framers of Utah's constitution were dissatisfied 
with the scope of protection provided by the fourth amendment, 
they would have drafted a textually different search and seizure 
provision instead of adopting language that is nearly identical 
to that of the fourth amendment. Instead, the framers drafted an 
entirely separate state constitutional provision for the 
protection of religious freedom: "No inhabitant of this State 
shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or 
her mode of religious worship . . . ." Utah Const, art. III.12 
See K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence Under the Utah State Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267, 280 (1991). Having thus 
specifically protected religious practices, it is reasonable to 
12
 Article III then goes on to state, "but polygamous or 
plural marriages are forever prohibited." Having thus rejected 
the very practice that prompted the resented federal searches, it 
is reasonable to believe that the drafters of the state 
constitution assumed that those searches would become less of a 
problem. 
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believe that the drafters of Utah's constitution saw no reason to 
expand state protections against searches that were unrelated to 
such practices. 
Moreover, relying on the "views" of one religious 
segment and giving that group's views conclusive weight in 
interpreting the Utah constitution is problematic. A careful 
reading of the historical record shows that "Mormons were 
particularly disturbed by the federal criminal machinery that was 
responsible for criminal prosecutions." Cassell, The Mysterious 
Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State 
Constitutions: The Utah Example, P.63, unpublished article to be 
published in Fall 1993 Utah Law Review. To the extent that the 
historical experience of Mormons is particularly relevant, it 
certainly does not argue for a more expansive interpretation of 
restrictions for State law enforcement. Id. 
A review of the history of article I, section 14 
provides additional support for the proposition that the framers 
of Utah's constitution did not intend Utah's search and seizure 
provision to be interpreted differently than its federal 
counterpart.13 The development of Utah's search and seizure 
provision prior to the adoption of article I, section 14 reflects 
13
 The only reference to Article I, Section 14 at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1895 was as follows: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will take up section 14, 
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment. 
1 Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1895 319 (1898) . 
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a steady movement by the framers toward adoption of the precise 
wording of the fourth amendment. (See Addendum B of this brief 
for a textual history of article I, section 14.) With each 
progressive revision of Utah's search and seizure provision, its 
language became more similar to that of the fourth amendment. 
Indeed, only its original 1849 version is significantly different 
from the fourth amendment. The drafters jettisoned that language 
in 1872 in favor of language very similar to that of the fourth 
amendment. Each successive revision from that point forward 
constituted only minor stylistic changes until the current 
provision, which is virtually identical to the fourth amendment, 
was adopted in 1895. 
That the framers of the Utah Constitution adopted 
language so similar to the fourth amendment is significant 
because it suggests an intent to provide protections equivalent 
to those provided under the federal provision. In contrast, it 
is obvious that when they intended to provide more expansive 
protections than those provided under the federal constitution, 
the framers of the Utah Constitution signaled that intent by 
drafting provisions that were textually distinct from those of 
the federal constitution. For instance, the provisions of Utah's 
constitution dealing with religious freedom and other inalienable 
rights are very different from their federal counterparts. See 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 1 & 4. Instead of merely adopting the 
language of the first amendment, the framers of Utah's 
constitution drafted detailed religious freedom and separation of 
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church and state provisions. Ibid. Had the framers similarly 
intended the state's search and seizure provision to provide 
protections different from those afforded to citizens under the 
federal constitution, then article I, section 14 surely would 
feature more detailed and expansive language than that of the 
fourth amendment. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court have 
claimed that the drafters of article I, section 14 intended that 
it be construed differently than the fourth amendment. Indeed, 
Utah's court have implicitly recognized that there is nothing in 
Utah's history, and especially the history of article I, section 
14, that justifies departing from the federal search and seizure 
standards developed under the fourth amendment. Instead of 
relying upon the historical context in which article I, section 
14 was adopted as the basis for rejecting federal search and 
seizure law, Utah's courts have departed from the federal 
standards only in the limited circumstances articulated in State 
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), as discussed in the next 
section. 
2. Although the Language of Article I, Section 14 is 
Nearly Identical to that of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Utah Provision May Be Interpreted Differently From the 
Federal Provision Under the Narrow Circumstances 
Articulated in State v. Watts. 
According to Bobo. the second factor to analyze in 
developing novel state constitutional arguments is the appellate 
treatment of state constitutional provisions that are textually 
similar to their federal counterparts. The Utah Supreme Court 
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has already articulated its position with respect to how article 
I, section 14 should be interpreted. As explained in State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988): 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the 
fourth amendment, and thus this Court had 
never drawn any distinctions between the 
protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court 
has always considered the protections 
afforded to be one and the same. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. See also State v. Jasso, 439 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1968); State v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968); State 
v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) (all construing article I, 
section 14 as providing the same scope of protection as the 
fourth amendment). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Watts also noted: 
In declining to depart in this case from our 
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret 
article I, section 14 of our constitution in 
a manner different from the fourth amendment 
to the federal constitution, we have by no 
means ruled out the possibility of doing so 
in some future case. Indeed, choosing to 
give the Utah Constitution a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an 
appropriate method for insulating this 
state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (citations omitted). 
Since Watts, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court 
have, in specific settings, given article I, section 14 a 
different interpretation than that given to the fourth amendment. 
However, it is clear that article I, section 14 may be given an 
interpretation different from that given to the fourth amendment 
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only under the limited circumstances enunciated in Watts. 
Moreover, in each instance where Utah's courts have departed from 
federal search and seizure standards, they have done so because 
of inconsistencies or confusion in the federal analysis. See 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (rejecting United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)); State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (rejecting New York 
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)); State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141, 149 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993) 
(clarifying Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 
110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)). 
Considered collectively, Watts, Larocco, Sims and 
Thompson make clear that article I, section 14 should generally 
be interpreted as is the fourth amendment by the federal courts. 
Only in those instances where the federal courts have vacillated 
between various standards such that "the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations [of] the fourth amendment" Watts, 750 P.2d at n. 
8, have become so prevalent that it is necessary "to simplify . . 
. the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and the courts and, at the same time, 
provide the public with consistent and predictable protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures," Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
469, should Utah courts embark upon an interpretative journey 
into the Utah Constitution. 
The federal standard for determining voluntariness of a 
consent to search has been well-established since the United 
29 
States Supreme Court decision in Schneckloth. Although 
Schneckloth has been the target of some criticism among 
commentators14, that criticism has remained almost exclusively 
academic. As demonstrated in the next section, Schneckloth 
continues to enjoy near universal acceptance among state courts. 
3. Nearly Every Jurisdiction Continues to Follow the 
Totality of Circumstances Test for Voluntariness 
Enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
The final factor identified by this Court in Bobo for 
the analysis of novel state constitutional arguments is citation 
to authority from other states supporting the particular 
construction urged by counsel.15 Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73 n.5. 
Under this "sibling state" approach, particular attention should 
be given to those states whose constitutions served as models for 
the Utah Constitution, as well as to authority from states in the 
same geographical region.16 See State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 
500 A.2d 233, 237 (1985) (describing "sibling state" approach) 
(cited as proper model of state constitutional analysis in, State 
14
 See, e.g., 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On 
The Fourth Amendment, § 8.1(a), at 152-154 (2d ed. 1987). But 
see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 55, 218-19 
(1973) (although critical of some of the Court's reasoning, the 
author concludes "the ultimate result in Bustamonte appears to be 
correct"). 
15
 For the Court's convenience, the search and seizure 
provisions from the constitutions of each of the fifty states is 
provided in Addendum C of this brief. 
"Defendant totally fails to meet this portion of the Bobo 
briefing rule. Nowhere in his brief does he cite to the 
positions of other states in support of his novel approach to 
this issue. 
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v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986)). Commentators have 
identified several states whose constitutions served as models 
for the framers of the Utah Constitution: Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, 
New York, and Washington.17 A review of decisions from the 
courts of these states indicates that none have adopted positions 
that support defendant's proposed interpretation of article I, 
section 14. 
Even before the Supreme Court decided Schneckloth, 
Illinois refused "to require that the People show that the 
consenting party was advised of rights secured by the fourth 
amendment, [but] the failure to do so is a factor bearing on the 
understanding [of the] nature of the consent." People v. 
Haskell, 41 111.2d 25, 31, 241 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1968) (citations 
omitted). Illinois now applies the voluntariness standard 
articulated in Schneckloth. See, e.g.. People v. Sesmas, 591 
N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ill.App.3d 1992) ("Moreover, ignorance of 
knowledge of the right to refuse to consent does not vitiate the 
voluntariness of the consent but is merely a factor to 
consider.") (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated that 
the search and seizure provisions of the 
United States and Iowa Constitutions contain 
identical language. Consequently, they 
generally are "deemed to be identical in 
scope, import, and purpose." 
17
 See Wallentine, supra at 282 and authorities cited 
therein. 
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State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) (citations 
omitted). In keeping with this general rule, Iowa adopted 
Schneckloth and expressly noted that "knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is only one factor to be considered in answering 
the question of voluntariness." State v. Eae. 274 N.W.2d 350, 
353 (Iowa 1979) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. 
at 2047-48). 
Nevada has likewise adopted the Schneckloth standard 
for determining voluntariness of consent. Reese v. State, 596 
P.2d 212, 214 (Nev. 1979). In so doing, the Nevada Supreme Court 
recognized that one state, New Jersey, had departed from 
Schneckloth under its state constitution. Id. (citing State v. 
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)). Nevertheless, the 
Reese court reaffirmed its adherence to Schneckloth, noting that 
"[t]his court has never indicated that a different standard 
should apply in this state, but is in accord with the rule that 
voluntariness [of consent] is a question of fact to be determined 
from all the circumstances." id. (citations omitted). 
Washington does not appear to have expressly considered 
departing from Schneckloth. Rather, it has consistently applied 
the totality of circumstances test for determining voluntariness 
of consent. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 734 P.2d 516, 519-520 
(Wash. 1987) (citing Schneckloth and several Washington cases in 
which Schneckloth was applied). 
While Wallentine cites the New York Constitution as a 
possible influence on the framers of the article I, section 14, 
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Wallentine, supra at 282, he ignores the fact that New York's 
search and seizure provision, article I, section 12, was not 
adopted until 1938. Clearly a provision adopted more than forty 
after Utah's constitution could not have influenced article I, 
section 14. 
Therefore, the fact that New York appears to be the 
most willing of the states to depart from federal search and 
seizure law, is irrelevant to an interpretation of article I, 
section 14. Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution 
contains two paragraphs, the first of which is identical to the 
fourth amendment.18 However, despite their apparent willingness 
to depart from federal search and seizure law in other contexts, 
even New York courts continue to apply the Schneckloth standard 
for determining voluntariness of consent to search. See, e.g., 
People v. Khatib. 555 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (Sup. 1990) (applying 
Schneckloth and citing several other New York cases in which 
Schneckloth was applied). 
Just as none of the states whose constitutions may have 
served as models for the Utah constitution have adopted positions 
that support defendant's proposed interpretation of article I, 
section 14, neither have any of the western states departed from 
Schneckloth. See, e.g., State v. Paredes. 810 P.2d 607, 610 
18
 According to Wallentine, the second paragraph of Article 
I, Section 12 addresses electronic surveillance, and closely 
parallels an applicable federal statute. Wallentine, supra at 
note 103 (citing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988)). 
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(Ariz. App. 1991)19; People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 114, 137 
Cal.Rptr. 447, 455 (1977); State v. Bedolla, 806 P.2d 588, 593 
n.2 (N.M. App. 1991); Stamper v. State. 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 
1983); (all applying Schneckloth). Even before Schneckloth was 
decided, a number of western states rejected the suggestion that 
police be required to inform a suspect that he had the right to 
refuse the officer's request for consent to search. See 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 n.14, 93 S. Ct. at 2050 n.14 (citing 
cases from California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska 
and Oregon, among others). None of these states appear to have 
since departed from their original positions or from Schneckloth. 
More importantly, several of Utah's neighboring states 
have expressly refused to depart from Schneckloth under their 
state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Hayhurst. 571 P.2d 
721, 724 n.4 (Colo. 1977) (refusing to require Miranda-type 
warning under the state constitution and citing several pre-
Schneckloth Colorado decisions for the same proposition); State 
v. Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho 1980) (refusing to 
require defendants be advised of their right to refuse consent 
under state constitution and reaffirming its adoption of the 
federal standard); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont. 
19
 gee also State v. Knaubert. 550 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Ariz. 
1976) ("Defendant has cited no authority [for the proposition] 
that the Arizona Constitution requires that the record show that 
an in custody defendant knew that he had the right to refuse to 
consent to the search. Absent such authority, we are unwilling 
to apply a more stringent requirement under the Arizona 
Constitution than is imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.") (emphasis added). 
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1982) (refusing to impose a stricter standard under the Montana 
Constitution than that required under Schneckloth); State v. 
Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977) (declining to interpret 
state constitution more restrictively than fourth amendment and 
rejecting Miranda-type warning requirement). 
Expanding the scope of inquiry to include the rest of 
the states, it is clear that Schneckloth enjoys near universal 
acceptance. At least four additional states have refused to 
interpret their state constitutions as requiring a more stringent 
standard of voluntariness than that required under the fourth 
amendment. See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979) 
(After noting that the language of article I, section 14 of the 
Alaska Constitution is almost identical to the fourth amendment, 
the court held that fI[t]he Court in Schneckloth rejected the 
argument [that the state must prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse consent to the search], and we do not believe 
that the Alaska Constitution requires a different standard for 
noncustodial consent searches."); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386 
(Ark. 1977) ("In our view the Schneckloth standard of required 
proof in consent to search is adequate under the terms of our 
constitution. Art. 2, § 15, Ark. Const. (1874)."); State v. 
Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1979) (refusing to impose 
heavier burden under the New Hampshire Constitution than that 
required under Schneckloth); State v. Rodaers. 349 N.W.2d 453, 
459 (Wis. 1984) (declining to adopt different definition of 
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consent under state constitution than that required under fourth 
amendment). 
Although one court has said that "it would be a good 
policy for police officers to advise persons that they have a 
right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search [even though 
that procedure is not] constitutionally required," Osborne. 402 
A.2d at 498,20 the Schneckloth standard for determining 
voluntariness of consent enjoys overwhelming acceptance among the 
states. See also Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 781 n.5 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (noting that warning of right to refuse 
consent is "good police practice," but nevertheless embracing 
Schneckloth). Moreover, the State has been unable to find even a 
single court that has decided to require law enforcement to give 
suspects a Miranda-type consent warning.21 Indeed, it appears 
that only two states, Mississippi and New Jersey, have departed 
from Schneckloth. See State v. Ellis, 586 A.2d 876 (N.J.Super. 
1990), and State v. Johnson. 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1977) (under the 
New Jersey Constitution, the validity of a consent to search, 
even in a noncustodial situation, must be measured in terms of 
waiver, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right 
20
 But as previously noted, even the court in Osborne 
refused to depart from Schneckloth under its state constitution. 
Osborne, 402 A.2d at 497. 
21
 After Miranda was decided, at least one commentator 
predicted that courts would require that police give a "Miranda-
type" warning when requesting consent to search. See Wilberding, 
"Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches?", 47 N.D.L.Rev. 281, 
284 (1971). Nevertheless, the concept of Miranda-type warnings 
for consent searches has been universally rejected by the courts. 
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to refuse consent); Lonastreet v. State, 592 So.2d 16, 19 (Miss. 
1991) (fI[V]alid consent to an otherwise illegal search must be 
accompanied by a knowledgeable waiver of a person's 
constitutional right not to be searched. . . . In other words, 
for a search which is based on consent alone, it is necessary 
that the person searched be aware of the right to refuse under 
the law.") (citing Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 550-51 (Miss. 
1983)). Neither New Jersey nor Mississippi have, however, gone 
so far as to require that police give a Miranda-type warning like 
that proposed by defendant, and, as noted above, numerous courts 
have rejected that concept. 
The great weight of authority militates against 
departing from the voluntariness of consent standard articulated 
in Schneckloth. The State already must meet the heavy burden of 
proving voluntariness. To impose the additional burden of 
proving actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent to a 
search will unnecessarily hinder law enforcement because it will 
enable defendants who have in fact voluntarily consented to a 
search to later claim that they did not know they could refuse to 
consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230. Although defendant 
suggests that a Miranda-type warning would resolve this problem, 
such a warning unnecessarily shackles law enforcement. Id. at 
231. Finally, while some commentators have criticized the 
voluntariness standard articulated in Schneckloth. the totality 
of circumstance test has been effectively applied since its 
inception by nearly every jurisdiction in the country. Unlike 
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the issues addressed in Thompson, Larocco, and Sims, the analysis 
of consent searches is not hopelessly complicated by "the 
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts," Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8, or 
confounded by the United States Supreme Court's "vacillation" 
between two diverse standards. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467. 
Consequently, there is no justification for departing from 
Schneckloth under the criterion established by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Watts and this Court should follow the general rule of 
adhering to federal search and seizure law. 
POINT V 
IF THIS COURT DECIDES TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A 
CONSENT TO SEARCH THAN THE VOLUNTARINESS 
STANDARD ESTABLISHED IN SCHNECKLOTH. THEN 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXPRESSLY HOLD THAT THE NEW 
RULE WILL APPLY ONLY PROSPECTIVELY. 
If this Court decides to depart from Schneckloth and 
either requires that the State prove that a defendant knew he had 
a right to refuse a request to search or imposes a Miranda-type 
warning requirement on state law enforcement, those requirements 
should be applied prospectively only and not retroactively. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), 
adopted three factors to guide determinations of whether a new 
standard should be applied retroactively: 1) the purpose to be 
served by the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on the old 
rule; and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of a 
retroactive application of the new rule. Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91 
(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708, 713 (1987)). 
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Applying these factors to the state constitutional analysis 
proposed by defendant indicates that neither the "knowledge 
standard" nor a Miranda-type warning should be applied 
retroactively. 
A Miranda-type warning of the right to refuse consent 
would be prophylactic because the warning would not itself create 
any rights, but would merely serve to ensure that suspects are 
aware of their rights. Such a prophylactic purpose "does not 
favor retroactivity," Andrews, 677 P.2d at 93, because it does 
not implicate the basic fairness of a trial.22 Similarly, 
requiring the State to prove that the defendant knew of his right 
to refuse consent does not fundamentally alter the right 
protected at trial. Consequently, because application of this 
new rule would serve as a guide for law enforcement in obtaining 
consent in future cases, but does not provide a new right for 
defendants at trial, this court should look to the remaining two 
factors which strongly militate in favor of prospective 
application only. 
Both of the proposed new rules would represent a clear 
break from existing standards that could not have been 
anticipated by law enforcement. Law enforcement have long relied 
on decisions from Utah's courts that have held that knowledge of 
the right to refuse to consent is only one factor in determining 
22
 As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he protections of the 
Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have 
nothing whatever to do with promoting the ascertainment of truth 
at a criminal trial." Schneckloth. 98 S.Ct. at 2055. 
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voluntariness. No other state has imposed a Miranda-type 
warning, and, as explained above, several have rejected such a 
requirement. Also, although New Jersey and Mississippi have 
opted to require proof of knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent, they are the only states that have done so. In short, 
the Court's Schneckloth standard has been the well established 
basis for determining validity of consent for many years, and law 
enforcement officials have relied on that standard. 
Consequently, the proposed "knowledge standard" and Miranda-type 
warnings would each mark a clear break from existing law. 
Generally, whenever such a clear break occurs, the Supreme Court 
"invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle 
nonretroactive." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549, 102 
S.Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982) .23 
Retroactive application of any new standard would have 
an adverse effect on the administration of justice in Utah. In 
Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court looked at the adverse effect 
that retroactive application of the Wade and Gilbert standards on 
identification evidence would have on the administration of 
justice and found that "[i]t is . . . very clear that retroactive 
application . . . 'would seriously disrupt the administration of 
our criminal laws.'" 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1966)(citation omitted). 
23
 See also Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68 (in adopting the rule 
that the state must prove suspects were aware of their right to 
refuse consent, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that its 
"decision [was] to have prospective effect, applying only to 
searches based on consent which take place after the date of 
[this] opinion"). 
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That is likewise true in this instance because retroactive 
application would require collateral inquiry into every consent 
search case in the state in order to determine if the defendant 
knew he could refuse the request to search. Opening the doors to 
collateral attack on every consent search in Utah would seriously 
impair the administration of justice in the state. 
The State already bears the heavy burden of proving 
that a consent to search was voluntarily given. While the 
proposed standards do not fundamentally alter the rights of 
defendants at trial, both represent a clear break with past 
precedent and, if applied retroactively, would have an adverse 
effect on the administration of justice in Utah. Consequently, 
should this Court adopt either the "knowledge standard" of proof 
or a Miranda-type warning, it should expressly hold that they 
apply prospectively only.24 
CONCLUSION 
Deputy Barney lawfully stopped defendant's car based on 
his observation of fishtailing. When he subsequently smelled a 
common drug masking agent, the deputy reasonably asked if 
defendant was transporting narcotics. Deputy Barney's subsequent 
24If this Court decides to create such a rule, the question 
as to what the proper remedy for any violation of that new state 
constitutional rule can only be properly addressed after 
supplemental briefing by the parties. Likewise, if this Court 
creates a new rule, the proper remedy in this case would be a 
remand to the trial court to allow the State to attempt to 
demonstrate whether or not defendant did in fact know of his 
right to refuse consent. 
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warrantless search of defendant's car and trunk was proper based 
on defendant's voluntary consent. 
Defendant failed to demonstrate a subjective interest 
of privacy in the luggage. The trial court correctly concluded 
that this failure precluded defendant from complaining of any 
constitutional violation. This Court could also affirm the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress based on the fact that 
once defendant opened the trunk Deputy Barney smelled marijuana 
and had probable cause to search the luggage. 
Because defendant failed to show that his search 
consent was preceded by any police illegality, the trial court 
properly declined to engage in an attenuation analysis below. It 
is similarly unnecessary for this Court to engage in an 
attenuation analysis on appeal. 
Finally, defendant's claim under the state constitution 
fails to demonstrate any necessity to deviate from federal fourth 
amendment analysis. However, if this Court decides to impose 
this additional requirement on the State, that requirement should 
only be applied prospectively. Accordingly, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S day of November, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. CHAMNESS 
Assistant Attorney General 
42 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
D. GILBERT ATHAY, attorney for appellant, 72 East 400 South, 
Suite 325, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 5 day of 
November, 1993. 
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R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone< (801) 896-6812 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff, « 
VS. i 
GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka i 
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS 
GREGORY MATISON, i 
DOB: 
Defendant. i 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921600010FS 
i Judge Don V. Tibbs 
This Batter came before the Court on July 14, 1992, on Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. The Motion was argued by counsel for Defendant, Gil 
Athay, and R. Don Brown for the State. The parties have also submitted post-
hearing memoranda. Having duly considered the evidence and arguments of the 
parties, including recent federal and Utah decisional law, the Court now makes 
and enters the followingi 
F P D P G S Of ?ACT 
1. On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney was traveling to the 
Sallna interchange of 1*70 when he observed a vehicle which had just come off 
the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such exit. 
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2. Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish tall" as it cane onto 
the access road from the freeway and then the vehicle stopped at a gas 
station/convenience store. 
3. Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway underpass where the 
vehicle had been out of control to determine whether the action was the result 
of icy conditions and observed that the road was dry* 
4. The officer observed that the driver of the vehicle was still 
stopped at the business establishment and commenced traffic enforcement 
activities on 1-70 east of Salina. 
5. Upon subsequently observing the vehicle traveling eastbound out 
of Salina and knowing that there are no services for 110 miles in such 
direction, Deputy Barney decided to stop the vehicle to determine whether the 
driver was impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle at the 
Salina interchange. 
6. The officer stopped the vehicle at It33 p.m. as shown on the 
video tape recording of the scene of the stop. 
7. When the officer approached the Defendant's vehicle, the 
Defendant asked, "What am I being stopped for? Am I speeding?" 
8. Deputy Barney responded by indicating that he would explain in a 
moment and asked for the license and registration to the vehicle. 
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9. At It34s14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained the reason for the stop 
and the Defendant stated that he had been having trouble with his cruise 
control and that was why he was unable to control the vehicle. 
10. Deputy Barney had at this point swelled the odor of fresh 
ground coffee, an ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of raw marijuana, 
and noted the extreme nervousness of the Defendant who had offered an 
unreasonable explanation of his traveling in a vehicle for which he was not 
the owner. 
11. Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle contained firearms or drugs 
and after receiving a negative response asked, "May I look in the vehicle?" 
12. The Defendant consented at It34*35 p.m. 
13. At It35s50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the Defendant, "Would you 
pop the trunk," and the Defendant opened the trunk. 
14. Upon observing the suitcases in the trunk and smelling the 
suitcase, Deputy Barney handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at 1:36:38 
p.m. 
15. At It38102, Deputy Barney opened one of the cases sufficiently 
to observe marijuana. 
16. The vehicle was found to contain 138.25 pounds of marijuana. 
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gONCI^TON? Qf frAW 
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or testimony regarding his 
claim of interest in the substance seized or the contents of the vehicle and 
he lacks standing to challenge the search. 
2. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle was pursuant to a 
legitimate law enforcement function. 
3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the presence of firearms 
or drugs, voluntarily consented to open the vehicle for inspection. 
4. The officer used no threats or coercion and the Defendant's 
actions were voluntary. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this /( day of «E|fwt, 1992. 
H*TT.THg rpyjffCATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed in the United 
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully 
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thereon fully prepaid on the )4^ day of September, 1992, addressed as 
followsi 
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney at Law 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. R. Don Brown 
Sevier County Attorney 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
s ^ m m Mn. \Mv\i 
ADDENDUM B 
I. HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION IN UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The following history may be found at the Utah State Archives 
under the title "Constitution State of Deseret and Utah 
Constitutions, Memorials to Congress, and Proceedings of Convention 
1849-1959," Microfilm Document No. 080979, C. Reel I (1849-1895), 
Utah State Archives No. 700-0000-1400: 
1. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State 
of Deseret (1849): 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
2. Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the State of 
Deseret (1872) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and not 
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or 
places to be searched, and the person or persons, and 
thing or things, to be seized. 
3. Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah (1882) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and not 
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or 
places to be searched, and the person or persons, and 
thing or things, to be seized. 
4. Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah (1887) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
seizures and searches, shall not be violated, and not 
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
5. Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah (1895) (current provision): 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures 
and searches shall not be violated; and not warrant shall 
issue but on probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
II, FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
ADDENDUM C 
Alabama 
Article I, Sec. 5 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizures or 
searches, and no warrants shall issue to search any place 
or to seize any person or thing without probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation. 
Alaska 
Article I, Sec. 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and other property against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Arizona 
Article 2, Sec. 8 
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or 
his home invaded, without authority of law. 
Arkansas 
Article 2, Sec. 15 
The right of the people of this State to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrant shall issue, except upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or thing to be seized. 
California 
Article I, Sec. 13 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant may issue, except upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons and things to be 
seized. 
Colorado 
Article 2, Sec. 7 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any 
person or things shall issue without describing the place 
to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as 
near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation reduced to writing. 
Connecticut 
Article First, Sec. 7 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place or to seize 
any person or things shall issue without describing them 
as nearly as may be, or the person or thing to be seized, 
as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation. 
Delaware 
Article I, Sec. 6 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize 
any person or thing, shall issue without describing them 
as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 
Florida 
Article I, Sec. 12 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception 
of private communications by any means, shall not be 
violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon 
probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place or places to be searched, the person 
or persons, thing or things to be seized, the 
communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the 
evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed 
in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of 
this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such 
articles or information would be inadmissible under 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing 
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Georgia 
Article I, Sec. 13 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, except upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place, or places to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Hawaii 
Article I, Section 7 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized, or communications sought 
to be intercepted. 
Idaho 
Article I, Sec. 17 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
Illinois 
Article I, Sec. 6 
The people shall have the right to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or 
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices 
or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable 
cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Indiana 
Article I, Sec. 6 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Iowa 
Article I, Sec. 11 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Kansas 
Bill of Rights, Sec. 15 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and 
property against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or property to be seized. 
Kentucky 
Bill of Rights, Sec. 10 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and 
seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any place, 
or seize any person or thing, without describing them as 
nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation. 
Louisiana 
Article I, Sec. 5 
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, 
communications, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. 
No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, 
and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any 
person adversely affected by a search or seizure 
conducted in violation of this Section shall have 
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate 
court. 
Maine 
Article I, Section 5 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize 
any person or thing, shall issue without a special 
designation of the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause-
supported by oath or affirmation. 
Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, Article 26 
That all warrants without oath or affirmation, to search 
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are 
grevious[grievous] and oppressive; and all general 
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend 
suspected persons, without naming or describing the 
place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought 
not to be granted. 
Massachusetts 
Part I, Article 14 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches and seizures, or his person, his 
houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All 
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right if the 
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported 
by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant 
to a civil officer, to make searches in suspected places, 
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize 
their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, 
or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in 
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws. 
Michigan 
Constitution of 1963, Article I, Sec. 11 
The person, houses, papers, and possessions of every 
person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any 
person or things shall issue without describing them, nor 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to 
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic 
drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous 
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage 
of any dwelling house in this state. 
Minnesota 
Article I, Sec. 10 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Mississippi 
Article III, Sec. 23 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and 
possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no 
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place 
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
Missouri 
Article I, Sec. 15 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize 
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the 
place to be searched, or the person or thing seized, as 
nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported 
by written oath or affirmation. 
Montana 
Article II, Sec. 11 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any 
person or thing shall issue without describing the place 
to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or 
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation 
reduced to writing. 
Nebraska 
Article I, Sec. 7 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or things to be 
seized. 
Nevada 
Article I, Sec. 18 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or persons, and 
thing or things to be seized. 
New Hampshire 
Part First, Article 19 
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his 
houses, his papers, and all his possessions. Therefore, 
all warrants to search suspected places, or arrest a 
person for examination or trial in prosecutions for 
criminal matters, are contrary to this right, if the 
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported 
by oath or affirmation; and if the order, in a warrant to 
a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or 
to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize 
their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, 
or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued; but in 
cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by law. 
New Jersey 
Article I, Sec. 7 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the papers and things to be 
seized. 
New Mexico 
Article 2, Sec. 10 
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, 
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize 
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the 
place to be searched, or the persons or things to be 
seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation. 
New York 
Article I, Sec. 12 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
interception of telephone and telegraph communications 
shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants 
shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is 
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may 
be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of 
communication, and particularly describing the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted and 
the purpose thereof. 
North Carolina 
Article I, Sec. 20 
General warrants, whereby any officer or other person may 
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence 
of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons 
not named, whose offense is not particularly described 
and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and 
shall not be granted. 
North Dakota 
Article I, Sec. 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons and things to be 
seized. 
Ohio 
Article I, Sec. 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and possess ?*.s, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shal not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upor. probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Oklahoma 
Article 2, Sec. 30 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches or seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and describe , &s particularly as 
may be the place to be searched, ana the person or thing 
to be seized. 
Oregon 
Article I, Sec. 9 
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Pennsylvania 
Article I, Sec. 8 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize 
any person or things shall issue without describing them 
as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the 
affiant. 
Rhode Island 
Article I, Sec. 6 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
papers and possessions, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue, but on complaint in writing, upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and describing as 
nearly as may be, the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
South Carolina 
Article I, Sec. 10 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, the 
person or thing to be seized, and the information to be 
obtained. 
South Dakota 
Article VI, Sec. 11 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
affidavit, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Tennessee 
Article I, Sec. 7 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and 
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer 
may be commanded to search suspected places, without 
evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or 
persons not named, whose offences are not particularly 
described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to 
liberty and ought not to be granted. 
Texas 
Article I, Sec. 9 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or 
searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize 
any person or thing, shall issue without describing them 
as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation. 
Utah 
Article I, Sec. 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Vermont 
Article I, Sec. 11 
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their 
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or 
seizure; and therefore warrants, witnout oath or 
affirmation first made affording sufficient foundation 
for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to 
seize any person or persons, his, her or their property, 
not particularly described, are contrary to that right, 
and ought not to be granted. 
Virginia 
Article I, Sec. 10 
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger 
may be commanded to search suspected places without 
evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or 
persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly 
described and supported by evidence, are grievous and 
oppressive, and ought not to be granted. 
Washington 
Article I, Sec. 7 
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or 
his home invaded, without authority of law. 
West Virginia 
Article III, Sec. 6 
The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, 
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant 
shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, or the person or thing to be seized. 
Wisconsin 
Article I, Sec. 11 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
Wyoming 
Article I, Sec. 4 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by 
affidavit, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
